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Introduction
How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions in order to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do trade associations engage in environmental self-regulation and how do they tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? Is the 'shadow of hierarchy', the credible threat of legislation, executive intervention or court rulings, a necessary condition for associative action to emerge? Or is it only necessary if a redistributive problem is at stake? These are the questions discussed in this article. We will first develop the theoretical argument based on economic institutionalism, derive hypotheses and then submit the propositions to a first empirical assessment of associative self-regulation of waste recycling in the plastic and paper industry.
Theoretical Argument
The problems and processes of associative self-regulation may be theoretically grasped by applying concepts and propositions of new institutional economics and transaction cost theory (Brousseau and Fares 2000; North 1996; North 1990; Williamson 1975; Williamson 1996) . If industrial processes produce negative external effects for human health and the environment and there is a public awareness of the problems of these effects, industry in general prefers to solve this problem by opting for self-regulation instead of being subject to legislation. In this situation firms may engage in discussions, often in the context of an association, to address the problem and propose self-regulatory solutions. They may form a contract laying down specific obligations which aim at reducing the negative external effects of firms' activities on the environment and human health. Self-regulationalthough costly for private actors-has the advantage that the regulatory solutions provided are better adjusted to the specific problem at hand since private actors have more expertise in the area of regulation. In firms' views political collective rules frequently follow a different, political, rationale and, therefore, may be maladjusted to the regulatory problem at hand.
When drawing up a contract in which firms commit themselves to self-regulation, actors engage in a bargaining process. We assume that actors are rational utility maximizers, but boundedly so. They have limited knowledge of possible outcomes and solutions, they are uncertain about the future and are uncertain of other actors' objectives. Transaction costs will arise in the course of the search for possible solutions, in the bargaining of the contract and in the monitoring of actors' compliance with the contract. Given bounded rationality and transaction costs in the devising, agreeing on and implementation of regulatory solutions, the contract among firms will always be incomplete. Firms will not draw up a contract of cooperation that-in its provisions -anticipates every possible future contingency in the external environment and in actors' behavior. It will, therefore, be necessary to institute decision-making devices or, as Williamson argues, 'private ordering efforts' (Williamson 2002:178) on how to adjust the provisions of the contract in the course of its application. These decision-making devices are to ensure a successful coordination of actions after the contract has been adopted. They should provide a mechanism on how to adjust the contract provisions to new external conditions; they also are to secure the enforcement of the commitment of the contracting partners and to allow for a conflict settlement in case of a contradictory interpretation of contract provisions These decision-making devices or governance rules that private actors establish for the purpose of a successful contract application may include supervision, arbitration and dispute resolution delegated to a third private actor. Alternatively, a negotiation structure may be established that provides for the renegotiation of the contractual provisions each time a need of adjustment arises or a conflict between the contracting actors emerges Or recourse may be taken to an existing public judicial system. These governance rules themselves are incomplete contracts, too, that may be open to interpretation and may need to be re-adjusted to new external conditions (Brousseau and Fares 2000:411) .
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Of course, self-regulation by industry couched in contracts between private actors are embedded in an overall space of pre-existing and evolving collective political rules. These rules may be more or less numerous. Private actors will have to take extant collective political rules into account that relate to the issue of self-regulation in question (Brousseau and Fares 2000; Granovetter 1985; North 1990) . Hence, the choice between firms making their own rules (self-regulation) as opposed to the reliance on existing political rules/legislation is rarely an absolute one, but rather a combination of both. The reliance on public rules varies. Viewed as a continuum, at one end the option would be to entirely rely on legislation while at the opposite end of the continuum self-regulation by industry would be almost pure and only very marginally rely on public rules.
In most cases of self-regulation some political rule does play a role and has to be considered. The relationship between the political rules and self regulation of industry is at the center of our interest. What role does the shadow of hierarchy play in associative self-regulation? The shadow of hierarchy is usually seen in its threatening form, i.e. of negative sanctions in case of unsatisfactory selfregulation, such as a threat of legislation or a threat of executive intervention or a court ruling. However, it may also take the form of a positive incentive, such as government financially supporting private self-regulation or lending it public authority (see Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) . We therefore ask: which type of shadow of hierarchy does have which type of inducement effect on private actors' self-regulation?
The most well-known form of shadow of hierarchy is legislative threat. When threatening with legislation, legislators will threaten to enact adverse legislation in order to take influence on firms' conduct, unless firms alter their behaviour in such a way as to oblige with the legislators' demands. By implication, they promise that they will forego legislation if firms comply with the demands. Compliance with legislative threats may be considered as a form of 'implicit political transaction, in which the legislator barters the non-use of legislative power …in return for the firm's commitment to change its conduct' (Halfteck 2006:6) . A threat of legislative intervention may be explicit, implicit or anticipatory. An explicit threat implies an unambiguous communication threatening legislation. Under an implicit threat, legislators signal a threat without a concrete communication or legislative plan. In case of an anticipatory threat there is neither an explicit nor an implicit threat, but a threat may be issued in the future (Halfteck 2006:34ff) .
In a bargaining process over a contract of self-regulation that takes place in the shadow of a legislative threat, two aspects are of importance. Whether the firm is successfully induced to comply and engage in self-regulation depends on whether firms consider the legislator's threat credible and likely to be carried through (Halfteck 2006:3-6) . The legislator may underline his credibility by committing himself clearly to the political issue: he may seek to organize a supporting political coalition based on logrolling in parliament; he also may commit himself by informing the public about the importance of an issue and/or garner political backing by building on a NGOs' mobilizing campaigns. Legislators also may engage in 'brinkmanship' by gradually raising the likelihood of threatened legislation, and they may further underline their credibility by having a reputation of being credible or by committing themselves emotionally to an issue (Halfteck 2006:56-59) . Legislative threats elicit valuable information from industry, thereby reducing transaction costs, and increasing the likeliness of an effective outcome of the implicit political barter (Halfteck 2006:6) .
The collective action problems linked with associative self-regulation, we go on to argue, differ according to the problem type at hand. Redistributive problems and problems of the type of a prisoner's dilemma are much more conflict prone than coordination problems from which all stand to gain. The different issue properties are reflected in the actors' preferences with regard to a particular issue. We therefore expect that the shadow of hierarchy, in particular the threat of legislation, is required to ensure the successful implementation of redistributive and prisoner's dilemma problems.
Assumptions, Hypotheses and Methodology
We start from the following assumptions: actors, i.e. firms, associations and governmental actors are utility maximizers, but act on the basis of incomplete information as regards the likely behavior of the other actors and incomplete information regarding the best solutions for the environmental problem at hand. Actors are opportunistic and their commitment to the contract may be problematic. We also assume that firms prefer no regulation to self regulation and the latter to legislation because adversarial legislation may reduce the profitability of the firm (meta-preferences). Firms are well situated to regulate themselves because of the information asymmetry between governmental actors and firms with respect to the problem at hand. Associations of firms prefer self regulation over legislation over no action whatsoever because an important reason for their existence is to prompt the organization of self-regulation of firms. Governmental actors at different levels, national and supranational, are not considered as unified actors and are assumed to prefer legislation over selfregulation over no action when seeking to reduce negative external effects of firms' activities. However, they are also aware of the high transaction costs involved in the legislative process. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) prefer legislation over self-regulation over no action.
Using transaction cost theory in a strategic choice approach we derive hypotheses by first varying important attributes of the environment (legislative threat and NGO campaigns) holding actors attributes preferences constant (H1 and H1), then varying actors' preferences while holding the two aspects of the environment constant (H3).
Shadow of Hierarchy Hypotheses (H 1)

H 1
If there is a threat of legislation, firms will form associations or use existing associations to engage in self regulation.
As argued above, the credibility of a legislative threat may be underlined by a previous or simultaneous political mobilization and the garnering of political backing by building on NGO campaigns. We therefore submit the
Political Mobilization Hypothesis (H 2)
H 2
If there is strong political pressure from NGOs, firms will form associations or use existing associations to engage in self regulation.
We further assume that actors' situational preferences depend on the features of an issue at stake. Depending on the contested nature of an issue at stake the self-regulation contract among the involved actors will need strict governance rules to ensure contract implementation. Both in the case of redistributive and prisoners' dilemma problems the contracting partners will need to rely on strong conflict-solving governance rules. We therefore claim:
Problem-type Hypotheses (H3)
H 3.1: If a coordination/win-win problem (and actors situational preferences are similar) is at stake, no governance devices are needed.
H3.2 If a redistributive problem is at stake (and actors situational preferences are of a zero-sum nature) governance devices allowing for conflict solution through compensation of the losers will be developed. H 3.3 If a Prisoner's Dilemma problem is at stake (actors are tempted to free-ride) strict governance allowing for monitoring and sanctioning will be adopted.
Background Information: Self-Regulation of the European Paper and PVC Industry and Industry Structure
The German paper industry acted as a pacemaker in self-regulation of paper recycling. In 1994 firms of the graphic paper chain agreed with the Federal Ministry for Environment to achieve 60% recovery of graphic paper until 2000. This target was met before 2000 and the agreement was renewed, increasing the rate to 80%. In the UK, the Newspaper Publishers Association (NPA) concluded a voluntary agreement with the government. This aimed at increasing the recycled content of newsprint by 70% between [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . At the European level, self-regulation was initiated by the Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) in 2000, joined by two full-member associations and a number of supporting-member associations. A first five-year commitment was successfully concluded in 2005, achieving a recycling rate of 56% of paper and board products; a second five-year agreement increases the objective to 66%. The conditions of developing recycling schemes are very different in the two industries. The predictability of costs and the development of the respective markets vary considerably. When the 'European Declaration' in the paper sector was established, recovery methods were well developed. Experience such as in Germany demonstrated that recycling rates up to 70-80% were achievable. The market dynamics pointed to a steady increase in the global demand for recovered material and industry could easily predict future recycling rates. 4 The European PVC industry could draw on some national experience with recycling schemes such as the German take-back schemes for PVC window frames and recycling of PVC waste from processing and installation works. Overall, however, there was initially a lot of uncertainty about the feasibility of chemical and mechanical recycling of PVC and no pronounced market demand for recycled PVC.
Comparing the EU-level associations in the two sectors 5 , it appears that the 'European declaration' embraces a wider variety of actors along the chain, whilst 'Vinyl 2010' is constituted by a shorter supply chain. The associations representing the paper and board industry (CEPI and FEFCO) form the core of voluntary action in the paper sector, together with the waste management industry represented by ERPA. They join efforts with a number of actors further along the paper chain such as the ink and printing industry, or the newspaper and magazine publishers. 6 The four associations in the PVC sector represent the producers of the different components (vinyl, plasticizers, stabilizers) and those that convert them into different plastic products. 7 Under the voluntary agreements different actors within the associations pursue a common goal. However, there are also conflicts of interest. In the paper industry there are conflicts between sellers and buyers, whilst in the PVC industry conflicts between small and large firms appear to prevail.
Methodology
In order to empirically assess our hypotheses, we operationalize our independent and dependent variables as follows: 
Hypotheses in the Light of Empirical Findings
Shadow of Hierarchy or Legislative Threat Hypothesis (H1)
In our first two hypotheses we vary two attributes of the environment -i.e. legislative threat and NGO pressure -whilst holding actors' (firms and associations) attributes constant in order to scrutinize the outcome of the strategic action (see also Héritier and Eckert 2008) .
Under our legislative-threat hypothesis we expect that a credible threat prompts associative self-regulation. Comparing sectors (paper and PVC) and two periods of time at the national (DE, UK) and European level, the collected evidence overall supports this claim. At the national level, a period without a threat of legislation (t1) in the German and the British paper sectors, is compared to a period with a clear threat of legislation (t2). In the PVC sector, we compare two periods in Germany, and compare Germany and the UK, one with a legislative threat, the other without. At the European level, we compare both sectors across two periods each, one without, the other with a legislative threat.
In the paper sector, both in Germany and in the UK a legislative threat was clearly formulated. In Germany this threat materialized early in the 1990s:
There Comparing the German and British PVC sectors, it emerges that an explicit legislative threat prompted industry action in Germany, while the British industry organized in the absence of a legislative proposal. In Germany the environmental implications of PVC drew political attention throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Pohle 1997) . Plans to legislate against the use of PVC materialized most concretely in 1988 when a group of Green MPs requested to ban the material altogether and some municipalities such as Bielefeld declared themselves as 'PVC free zones'. The industry quickly responded by organizing a new association, the Working Group on 'PVC and Environment' the same year. 8 Its activities focus on information campaigns, the generation of scientific expertise and the preparation of self-regulatory measures regarding the sustainable production of PVC and the recycling of PVC waste. In 1993, two parliamentary motions from SPD and Green MPs requested to phase out PVC in some areas and/ or to close down production sites in order to reduce dioxin exposure. A parliamentary Enquete Commission on the 'Protection of the Human Being and the Environment' in 1994 however came to the conclusion that a substitution of PVC cannot be recommended.
9 Criticism gained new momentum in 1995 and 1996 with the debate around the role of PVC materials being responsible for the fires at a hospital in Aachen and the airport in Düsseldorf. Green MPs ensued. In the UK, after a debate on plasticizers in some PVC products (such as toys) in the 1990s, the government and the industry concluded a mandatory agreement stopping short from banning plasticizers. In a successive debate on PVC waste, government again refrained from PVC-specific legislation (Is-7-9). Instead, two important manufacturers of PVC and a group of retailers concluded VAs in 1999 (National Centre for Business & Ecology 1999).
The European case on PVC environmental issues demonstrates how an explicit legislative threat builds up over time and how industry responds to this by initiating self-regulation (Is-1-9, I-22, I-25, I-26, I-29). Reacting to member state initiatives, the environmental implications of PVC became an issue in several product-focused legislative acts. The Commission, strongly supported by the EP, The outcome was Vinyl 2010. The four sector associations signed a ten-year programme addressing the reduction of the use of heavy metal stabilizers, the recycling of PVC and the development of recycling technologies. Emission targets were set for the manufacturing of PVC, the gradual phase-out of lead until 2015 and the recycling of 200,000 tons of 'available post consumer waste' until 2010. As one interviewee concluded: '[…] from a political point of view, it (the issue AH/SE) has been taken off the table and they are waiting for the industry to deliver' (I-3).
In conclusion only one (UK PVC) out of eleven cases disconfirms our legislative threat hypothesis. In all other cases the absence or existence of a legislative threat mattered. In most cases (9 out of 10) new organizations were established. Interestingly, it is mostly special purpose associations that were created to govern self-regulation thereby circumventing a typical collective problem of sectoral roof associations.
In an association you always have to find the smallest common denominator. You never can actively tackle a specific issue because then some members would object: what are you doing with our membership fees […] Therefore we have established the working group for PVC over the entire chain (I-6, our translation).
Political Mobilization Hypotheses (H 2)
In our second hypothesis we expect that political pressure from NGOs induces firms to engage in associate self-regulation. In the paper sector NGO campaigns did not play a decisive role for the emergence of self-regulation in the period and countries under scrutiny. 10 NGOs started calling for higher recycling rates at a time when European industry was already actively engaging in selfregulation. From an industry perspective '[…] NGOs awoke to this only much later and they still demand things that we [the European paper industry, AH/SE] have already done many years ago and that have become "standard" in our industry. ' (I-14) .
In the PVC sector, by contrast, the influence of NGO campaigns on the formation of associative action was eminent. In Germany the PVC industry was under constant criticism notably from Greenpeace Germany campaigning to ban PVC 11 . 'In the beginning of the 90s we [the PVC industry, AH/SE] had enormous difficulties in being publicly heard: there were "the poisoners from industry" and "the saints from the ecological associations"' (I-1, our translation). As mentioned before, the criticism gained new momentum during the 1990s with the discussion about the fire incidents and the role of PVC in them. Greenpeace also launched focused actions concerning the application of PVC in toys, cosmetics and sports shoes (I-42). The PVC Working Group which was initiated in the late 1980s aimed at taking off this public pressure from industry. In the UK a fully-fledged NGO campaign took off only some years ago. Greenpeace criticized PVC packaging and targeted UK retailers (Leadbitter 2002, I-7,8) . It established a 'PVC Retail Working Group' and commissioned a study to investigate the option of phasing out PVC. Eventually, a dialogue developed between the PVC industry and the retailers. Two important PVC manufacturers signed an environmental charter and a eco-efficiency code of practice (Ecology 1999) with important retailers. Thus, indirectly, NGOs helped industry to set up self-regulation. As one interviewee stated: 'Greenpeace actually did those guys in the PVC industry a lot of good. ' (I-8) At the European level, Greenpeace launched activities in the mid-1990s (Is-41-43), influencing the debate by providing counter-expertise on the chlorine industry and by campaigning against its use in different applications:
If there is a political debate […] we can enrich it by providing scientific data and by popularizing the problem. For as long environmental topics are discussed behind closed doors, the environment is always losing out. Environmental issues can only prevail in a political discussion if they become public (I-43; our translation).
However, with the prospects of European PVC legislative measures fading, Greenpeace eventually abandoned its campaign:
Our meetings with the Commission became increasingly frustrating... there was no willingness whatsoever to transform arguments into political action. It makes no sense to continue the debate-[…] you have to see in which other areas […] to move things forward. (I-42, our translation).
In view of the waning NGO pressure, an interviewee from industry admitted: 'The biggest danger that we are now facing is that there is not much ado about PVC, so that we will fall asleep again.' (I-4)
In conclusion, all three PVC cases confirm our political mobilization hypothesis, whilst the paper cases disconfirm it. The empirical assessment of H1 and H2 shows that a credible legislative threat and NGO political mobilization in most cases prompts associative action.
Problem-type Hypotheses (H 3)
When empirically assessing the problem type hypotheses we vary actors' preferences while holding constant the environmental factors of legislative threat and NGO campaigns. We assume that the problem type-i.e. coordination (win/win), redistributive and PD problems-are reflected in the motivations of the involved firms. In the case of coordination problems or win/win situations, actors have similar preferences in favor of self-regulation because all stand to gain. Accordingly, no governance rules for monitoring and sanctioning will be needed for successful associative selfregulation. (H 3.1 
.).
Such win/win aspects are: avoiding legislation, raising reputation and providing mutual information. Our findings demonstrate that pre-empting legislation was a powerful motive for engaging in voluntary agreements in both sectors. Self-regulation is preferable since industry itself chooses the measures to take and can 'sell' the voluntary activity to a broader public in order to raise reputation: As expected, we do not find specific governance rules to address this type of issue. The cooperation of firms and associations appears to function smoothly where win/win aspects of selfregulation are concerned.
By contrast, associative action is more problematic in the case of redistributive problems where actors experience gains and losses. Redistributive implications most importantly result from the fact that costs and benefits (organizational and financial) of voluntary action are distributed unevenly among associations or firms. Hence governance rules allowing for conflict solution through compensation of the losers will be necessary (H 3.2) We encounter a zero-sum conflict in the paper sector: the paper and board industry seek to maximize the amounts of recovered material under the objectives set by the 'Declaration'. The traders and collectors of material, by contrast, shun the costs for making high quality material available:
We [the paper industry, AH/SE] have to tell the suppliers [...] that it is necessary […] to augment the quantity, […] without losing out in […] quality (I-16, our translation).
Improving quality is a common enterprise. It is not possible to pass these costs on to the suppliers solely. (I-15, our translation).
Further along the paper chain, a similar conflict over the cost of quality issue emerges between the printing industry and the paper industry: for the printing industries the quantity of recycled material does not matter, whilst the quality of paper is crucial for their business: In the PVC sector, another line of conflict about the use of associational resources emerged between the plasticizer producers and the other members. Given that the plasticizer which is most heavily used in PVC, phthalates, were subject to a focussed NGO campaign in the late 1990s, therefore wished to focus on a counter-campaign and research rather than spending money on 'Vinyl 2010': So, we have actually ended up suffering as a result of the money that we have had to pay into the voluntary commitment. (I-5) In view of redistributive conflicts, the association introduced governance rules ensuring the application of the contract by (i) the compensation of the 'losers' of self-regulation; and (ii) by allowing for flexible implementation and renegotiating the contract.
The first governance rule (i) provides for the compensation of the losers by the winners. The association which gains most takes on a leadership role in establishing associative action. We find evidence for this compensation in both sectors: under the European Paper Declaration, the paper industry's association launched the process and delivers most financial and human resources support. In the PVC sector, the resin producers assume a similar role:
The self-regulatory initiative has been driven by the paper industry […] The initiative was not on our side, but we were ready to participate […] we were jumping on the bandwagon (I-15, our translation)
The monitoring and the verification has been paid by CEPI alone […] The other associations, which are less involved in the quantitative target, they don't want to [pay a lot AH/SE]. (I-14) The PVC producers […] who initiated this in the first place […] said […] We cannot afford to do all of this by ourselves. So they looked at everybody in the supply chain to get involved.
[…] The people who are still pushing this most is the PVC industry. (I-5) .
Someone has to be the engine and somebody has to pay (I-4).
On the loser side the plasticizer producers is compensated by being accepted as an association that is nto a full legal member of 'Vinyl 2010'. Unlike the stabilizers association -which assumed legal personality in order to become a full partner -the plasticizers prefers not to be liable for selfregulatory action:
12 in consequence, under the association's governance rules, it is not granted a voting right on the board (I-5).
if you set yourself up under a legal entity, there are liability issues […] if something went dramatically wrong […] We don't because we are just contributing to it, but we are not a liable, legal entity. (I-5) Besides this 'limited membership', the plasticizer industry was also compensated financially since self-regulation under Vinyl 2010 fails to address their major concern:
The plasticizers haven't paid their full contribution, because their toys issue put so much demands on their resources that they were spending so much on scientific research (I-3).
The second strategy (ii) allows for flexibility during implementation. In both sectors, the selfregulation provides for a one-year funding scheme only which allows for renegotiation after a year (I-3, I-14) . Another element of flexibility is assured by setting aggregate targets. In both the paper and the PVC industry such targets allow for balancing out the regulatory burden among participating countries, small and large firms and the varying differing possibilities to collect and recycle products.
We need some flexibility. So, it could be easy for a big player to organize lots of recycling, but for a small player […] it can be difficult […] And then we also need to have some flexibility across countries. Some countries use more recovered paper and some countries less; but in all countries the level is increasing, but at an individual pace and that is normal […] . So this is why it is good to set a target on average, and then you can decide product by product. (I-14) Similarly, sub-targets have been identified for specific product groups in the PVC sector below the aggregate target of recycling 200,000 tons 'of available post consumer waste'. These sub-targets have been regularly reviewed and updated in view of the experience gained in the course of implementation 13 .
An ex post renegotiation of the contract also allows for a redefinition of targets in gathering recyclable material. The PVC industry, however, refrained from doing so:
The overall commitment of 200,000 tonnes by 2010 has been maintained and extended to the new Member States, keeping in mind that experience has demonstrated that the available volumes of PVC waste are actually lower than the ones expected in 2001.
14 An opportunity to re-negotiate the old contract presented itself when the European paper chain engaged in the second 'Declaration' in 2006. Responding to concerns raised by the suppliers of recovered material, the recycling target was redefined in order to take account of export: 'the target recycling rate includes net recovered paper exports to countries outside Europe'. Moreover, the participating associations are given the possibility to formally resign from the commitment.
In conclusion, in the case of redistributive problems we find evidence that governance mechanism such as the compensation of losers, flexibilisation and the renegotiation of the contract play an important role.
In our last Prisoners' Dilemma hypothesis we expect that actors' temptation to free-ride is contained by strict governance mechanisms. However, that would only apply to free-riding within the associative agreement. If an industry remains outside the agreement altogether such rules would be of no use. By refraining from formally joining, firms may-while in principle fully agreeing with the desirability of avoiding legislation and improving their reputation by self-regulation-may still be tempted to save costs by not incurring costs of membership. In the paper sector, for instance, the European Tissues Symposium did not participate in the first declaration, but joined in the second round. The association observed the implementation of the first five years, whilst already using the positive record of the initiative for public relation purposes (I-17). In the paper sector the 2007 created 'Vinyl Foundation' aims at bringing on board some of those that so far do stay outside the agreement. By establishing a 'positive list' of plastic converters that pay their share, the visibility of contributors will be increased. This strategy of positive discrimination should increase the reputation costs for free-riders.
In the PVC sector, 'free riding' by staying outside of the agreement has been particularly relevant for the plastic converters due to the large number of small firms. The costs of identifying such freeriders may indeed be larger than the benefit of bringing them on board (I-4). As one interviewee (I-6) estimated: approximately 20% of firms of the sector are not organized within the association representing plastic converters. Opting out has been mentioned by the additive producers' organization stating that member firms have left the agreement for cost reasons.
[…] Free-riding is a real problem to anybody in this [...] Free-riding by not implementing the voluntary accord of which an industry is a member allows firms to save costs and achieve a competitive advantage, as well. In the paper sector, compliance differs considerably across countries. In some countries, suppliers of recovered paper do not comply with the prescribed quality standards (I-15). Some national associations deliver the statistical data in an unreliable and non-comparable way, while others faithfully fulfill their reporting duties (I-16). In the PVC sector, some stabilizer producers have delayed the phasing out of lead in order to gain a competitive advantage (I-2,4); and converters do have an incentive to shirk when they report the volume of PVC resin used since these form the basis of their financial contribution to the agreement.
The governance rules used to contain free-riding during implementation, such as monitoring and sanctioning, are not easy to apply. The fragmentation of the market, the fact that firms do often have multiple locations and that material is exported renders monitoring of non-compliance difficult.
In the paper sector, monitoring tools have been established, such as an annual monitoring report containing specific quantifications on the progress towards targets. A monitoring task force drafts the reports and submits it to the European Recovered Paper Council composed of signatories, supporters and observers (EU institutions and stakeholders). Independent consulting firms are charged with the auditing and control of the reports on the recycling. The text of the agreement on self-regulation and the cooperation among the associations is governed through internal by-laws which identify the constituents of the agreement, specify the tasks of the parties involved, allocate secretarial and organizational tasks and the financing of audits.
Similar monitoring devices exist in the PVC industry: progress is being reported on an annual basis and observed by a monitoring committee (including the European Commission and the Parliament), auditing tasks are delegated to a consultancy firm. These tools have been complemented by a new initiative taken in 2007 with the creation of the so-called 'Vinyl Foundation'. It has the task to collect the funds from the PVC converters for 'Vinyl 2010' in order to improve compliance of the participating parties. The 2007 created 'Vinyl Foundation' aims at bringing on board some of those that so far do stay outside the agreement. By establishing a 'positive list' of plastic converters that pay their share, the visibility of contributors will be increased. This strategy of positive discrimination should increase the reputation costs for free-riders.
In conclusion, in both sectors various governance rules have been developed in order to contain free-riding within the voluntary agreement.
Conclusions
So why and how do firms and trade associations coordinate their actions in order to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? When do they engage in environmental self-regulation and what kind of governance devices do they develop in order to tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? Is the 'shadow of hierarchy', the credible threat of legislation, executive intervention or court rulings, a necessary condition for associative action to emerge? Or is it only necessary if a redistributive problem is at stake?
By first varying two important attributes of the information environment in which private actors engaging in self-regulation interact, legislative threat and NGO campaigns, we developed a number of hypotheses. Our empirical findings show that in all but one case a threat of legislation matters when developing associative action. Evidence is less clear as regards NGO campaigns given its absence in the paper sector. NGO campaigns therefore may underline a legislative threat and raise its credibility, but by itself are not a sufficient condition for self-regulation to emerge.
By secondly varying actors' preferences as function of the problem type at hand, we develop further propositions. Redistributive problems and problems of the type of a prisoner's dilemma are much more conflict prone than coordination/win-win type of problems from which all stand to gain. In order to deal with the former two problem types, industry actors recur to various governance devices such as flexible contract design and winners' compensation of losers to solve redistributive problems. Prisoner's dilemma problems may only partially be addressed by governance devices to the extent that free-riding is controlled and sanctioned within an association.
We conclude that private actors engaging in self-regulation will not successfully manage all types of conflicts. Nevertheless, by efforts of 'private ordering' (Williamson 2002:13) they seek to address all types of issues, of a negative sum and positive sum nature. They lack powerful sanctioning tools to deal with PD situations, but prove to be able to flexibly handle redistributive problems. 6, 15, 16, 20, 22, 25, 34, 35, 40, 41 and 44 were conducted in German, Interview no. 38 in French. Quotes in the text have been translated by the authors.
